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Multilevel governance entails transformations of statehood, leading to 
significant changes both in the public sphere of politics and the private 
sphere of economic activity and in their modes of interaction, the law 
included. The fragmentation of the public sphere and the decentering of 
the state have led to new types of regulation and the emergence of global 
regulatory networks, thereby intermingling the public and the private. The 
transition from government to governance blurs a clear hierarchy of 
norms and the distinctions between hard/soft and public/private law; it 
encourages a fragmentation of public functions. Renewed international 
legalization has been seen by some in formalist terms, as a way of 
providing some certainty and predictability; this view has been used to 
buttress the legitimacy of global governance Although there have been 
attempts to improve coordination between international regimes, they 
seem generally to spawn further regulatory networks; any formal 
constitutionalization of international regimes seems unlikely. 
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1. Governance and legitimacy 
A number of commentators have described and analyzed in various ways the shift from 
government to governance and the emergence of international regulatory networks.1 They 
describe these changes variously as involving a fragmentation, hollowing-out, 
disaggregation, or decentering of the state, but are generally agreed that they entail a 
devolution of specific functions to specialized regulators accompanied by new types of 
public-private interactions. There is also a general consensus that these are global trends, 
although perspectives vary as to the importance of domestic political processes—
compared with international influences—as drivers of these processes.  
A key question raised by these changes is their implications for the legitimacy of 
governance processes. Here opinions are more varied. Some see these emergent 
processes, especially the growth of international regulatory or governance networks, 
essentially as further development of the classic liberal system of interdependent states; 
indeed, they are seen as a strengthening of that system. Thus, Anne-Marie Slaughter has 
painted a picture of “the real New World Order,” which she describes as a growth of 
cooperative networks among government officials at the substate level, who remain 
accountable to citizens through national state mechanisms.2 However, in response to 
those who argue that this is a more far-reaching and problematic phenomenon that raises 
basic questions about political legitimacy,3 she concedes that there may be some 
accountability problems.4 While continuing to maintain the legitimacy of these forms of 
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1 See, e.g., THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY REFORMS FOR THE AGE OF 
GOVERNANCE (Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur eds., Edward Elgar 2004); MODERN GOVERNANCE: 
NEW GOVERNMENT–SOCIETY INTERACTIONS (Jan Kooiman ed., Sage 1993); PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN 
THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (Karl-Heinz Ladeur ed., Ashgate 2004); Sol Picciotto, The Regulatory 
Criss-Cross: Interaction between Jurisdictions and the Construction of Global Regulatory Networks, in 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION 89 (William W. Bratton, Joseph 
McCahery, Sol Picciotto & Colin Scott eds., Clarendon Press 1996); R. A. W. Rhodes, UNDERSTANDING 
GOVERNANCE: POLICY NETWORKS, GOVERNANCE, REFLEXIVITY, ACCOUNTABILITY (Open Univ. Press 
1997); Inger-Johanne Sand, Understanding the New Forms of Governance: Mutually Interdependent, 
Reflexive, Destabilised and Competing Institutions, 4 EUR. L. J. 271 (1998); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A 
NEW WORLD ORDER (Princeton Univ. Press 2004). 
 
2 Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 186 (1997). 
3 See, e.g., Philip Alston, The Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and Globalization, 8 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 435 (1997); Sol Picciotto, Fragmented States and International Rules of Law, 6 SOC. & 
LEGAL STUD. 259 (1997). 
4 Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Accountability of Government Networks, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 347, 
348–350 (2001). 
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cooperation due to their intergovernmental character, she has responded with a “menu of 
possible solutions” and some “global norms” generally aimed at making the new 
processes “more visible.”5 However, she does go on to suggest mobilizing around them a 
“whole set of transnational actors,” and that this might even amount to “a kind of 
disaggregated global democracy based on individual and group self-governance.”6 She 
recognizes that this entails alternative visions of “vertical democracy” through national 
states, or a more radical type of “horizontal democracy.”7  
While it seems clear that national states are neither moribund nor even in decline, 
statehood itself has been undergoing substantial transformations, both internally and 
internationally. The main focus of attention has been on the “democracy deficit” of the 
international sphere. However, national systems of representative democracy, even those 
with a long history, have been under great strain, as well, and have been undergoing 
extensive reforms. It is generally believed that decisions at the global or international 
level are too remote from ordinary citizens to be subject to the usual accountability 
mechanisms of representative democracy.8 With the growth in the scope and importance 
of decisions taken at the international level, legitimation has come to depend, first, on 
expertise and, second, on the increasing legalization of international institutions. There 
has also been a growing debate about constitutionalization at the international level, as it 
builds further on the existing process of legalization. However, any additional extension 
of the dominant liberal model of constitutionalism to the international level would 
entrench constitutionalized norms as constraints on national states. Not surprisingly, this 
possibility has proven controversial, in view of the implications for national structures of 
democratic accountability. 
The legitimacy of important and increasingly extensive international regulation 
has come to rely, substantially, on expertise, since much of the activity of international 
regulatory networks is done by cadres of technical specialists, sometimes described as 
“epistemic communities.” This concept was developed within a neofunctionalist 
paradigm to suggest that a stronger basis for international cooperation could be provided 
by delegating specific issues to specialists who would deal with them in a depoliticized 
fashion, deploying scientific, managerial, or professional techniques and working within 
shared universal discourses. This perspective fits with the traditional Weberian view of 
technocracy, seeing it as an instrument of politics and as a means of implementing 
policies that have been formulated through political processes. From this vantage point, 
the increasing degree of delegation to specialist regulators is understood as a response to 
the problems of governing ever more complex societies; thus, ever greater autonomy is 
extended to technocratic decision makers within a policy framework set by government. 
In the international context, it has been suggested that communities of experts, working 
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within a shared epistemic perspective, can facilitate the resolution of global policy issues 
by “narrowing the range within which political bargains could be struck.”9  
However, the complexity of governing modern societies has exacerbated the 
dangers that Weber had already identified with the task of controlling the irresistible 
advance of bureaucracy; at stake is the safeguarding of individual freedom and 
democracy.10 The fragmentation of the state and the new forms of interaction between the 
public and the private spheres entail not a retreat from but a remodeling of statehood; the 
combination of these forces has led to a trend toward what has been described as a “new 
regulatory state.”11 Functions previously considered unique to government have been 
recast as societal problems concerning a variety of actors.12 Influential commentators 
have argued for the redefinition of the role of government in order to separate “steering” 
from “rowing,” suggesting that politicians should define aims and targets but subcontract 
delivery, which should be competitive and aim to meet the needs of customers.13 While 
maintaining a separation of policy formulation and operational delivery, this approach 
devolves greater responsibilities onto those responsible for implementation who are, 
therefore, more directly accountable for the delivery of services, even though this process 
takes place through more diffuse, market-style mechanisms.  
The fragmentation of the state and the shift away from hierarchical command-
and-control towards more decentralized, networked forms of regulation can also be 
understood from a Foucauldian perspective of “governmentality.” The disintegration of 
hierarchical bureaucratic structures in both the public and private sectors can be seen as a 
shift in modes of social control toward more dispersed and internalized disciplinary 
forms—“from the cage to the gaze.”14 Thus, the new regulatory governance may be said 
to involve a “proliferation of a whole range of apparatuses pertaining to government and 
a complex body of knowledges and ‘know-how’ about government.”15 In particular, 
Miller and Rose have developed Latour’s concept of “action at a distance” into a notion 
                                                 
9 Emanuel Adler & Peter M. Haas, Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of 
a Reflective Research Program, 46 INT’L ORG. 367, 378 (1992). 
10 See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 1403 (Univ. of 
Cal. Press 1978). When technocracy loses its basis in social values, and its rationality becomes merely 
instrumental, it is known as the “iron cage problem.” See Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make the 
Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 146–150 (2003). 
11 E.g., Giandomenico Majone, The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe 17 WEST EUR. POL. 77 (1993); 
Martin Loughlin & Colin Scott, The Regulatory State, in 5 DEVELOPMENTS IN BRITISH POLITICS 205 
(Patrick Dunleavy, Andrew Gamble, Ian Holliday & Gillian Peele eds., Macmillan 1997); John 
Braithwaite, The New Regulatory State and the Transformation of Criminology, 40 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 222 (2000). 
12 Jon Pierre, Introduction: Understanding Governance, in DEBATING GOVERNANCE 1, 2-7 (Jon Pierre ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2000). 
13 DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS 
TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 25 (Addison-Wesley 1992). 
14 Michael Reed, From the ‘Cage’ to the ‘Gaze’? The Dynamics of Organizational Control in Late 
Modernity, in REGULATION AND ORGANIZATIONS: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 17 (Glenn Morgan & 
Lars Engwall eds., Routledge 1999). 
15 Nikolas Rose & Peter Miller, Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government, 43 BRIT. J. 
SOC. 173, 174 (1992). 
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of “government at a distance” as the construction of networks of interests allied with each 
other through the adoption of shared vocabularies, theories, and explanations.16 This 
entails a different and more critical view of expertise, and one which may have particular 
relevance to global governance.  
Technicism is one of the three major features that distinguish multilayered 
network governance from the classical liberal international system.17 These 
characteristics are interrelated and derive from the fragmentation of the classical liberal 
international system, which resulted largely from the processes that liberalization itself 
promoted. The next section will briefly outline these characteristics, the third of which is 
technicism; this will be followed by  examples and analysis, focusing on the governance 
of finance and taxation. The final section will discuss some of the issues raised by the 
debates on legification and constitutionalization of global institutions. This will focus 
mainly on the World Trade Organization (WTO), which is an important node or point of 
intersection for the various regulatory networks and has certainly become much more 
legalized, and which some have suggested should be constitutionalized. 
 
1.1. Characteristics of multilevel global governance 
The first characteristic of these new systems of governance can be discerned in the 
destabilization of the traditional normative hierarchy, where—on the one hand—states 
were bound by international law while—on the other—the choice of which national 
system of rules applied to the activities of private actors was determined by principles of 
jurisdictional allocation and choice of law. The heterarchical character of networked 
governance means that the determination of the legitimacy of an activity under any one 
system of norms is rarely definitive; it can usually be sidestepped or challenged by 
reference to another system. Various forms of supranational and infranational law have 
created complex interactions between a variety of adjudicative and regulatory bodies at 
different levels. These involve both competition and coordination.18 Similarly, various 
types of linkages have emerged between different but related regulatory networks, 
although their kaleidoscopic character makes it difficult to establish an overall coherence. 
This gives private parties—both individuals and, especially, legal persons such as firms 
and organizations—opportunities to manage regulatory interactions through strategies of 
forum selection and “forum-shifting.”19 Indeed, as has been pointed out by commentators 
                                                 
16 Peter Miller & Nikolas Rose, Governing Economic Life, 19 ECON. & SOC. 1, 10 (1990). 
17 See Sol Picciotto, Regulatory Networks and Multi-Level Global Governance, in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS: 
SELF-GOVERNANCE AND LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS 315 (Olaf Dilling, Martin 
Herberg & Gerd Winter eds., Hart 2008). 
18 Debates about regulatory competition and the “race to the bottom” (or to the top), such as those discussed 
in DALE D. MURPHY, THE STRUCTURE OF REGULATORY COMPETITION: CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC 
POLICIES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (Oxford Univ. Press 2004), have tended to overlook the many ways in 
which regulatory regimes are interdependent and coordinated. See Picciotto Regulatory Criss-Cross, 
supra note 1, at 91–92. 
19 This concept has been analyzed mainly in relation to powerful states—that is, governments—and in 
connection with norm creation. See John Braithwaite & Peter Drahos, Forum-shifting and Contests of 
Principles, in GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 564 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2000) (discussing how 
lawyers acting for private parties developed forum-shopping as a tactic). It has been extended beyond 
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such as Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, power in a networked world derives from 
mobility and connectedness.20  
As a second characteristic, we may observe that there has been a blurring between 
categories of norms, in particular, between “hard” and “soft” and public and private law. 
Thus, regulation typically involves a mixture of legal forms, both public and private, and 
an interplay between state and private ordering, or, frequently, the emergence of norms 
with a hybrid status. Public bodies may use private law forms, such as service contracts, 
for regulatory purposes,21 while private bodies may operate regulatory arrangements, 
even in relation to the public sector.22 Global economic regulatory networks, in 
particular, use “soft law” forms, such as codes of conduct, memorandums of 
understanding (MOUs), and guidelines. This state of affairs is the result of several 
factors.  
One such factor is the emergence of regulation based on the increased 
formalization of norms, taking the place of informal and closed systems of “club rule.”23 
A second stems from the previously mentioned trait, namely, that global governance is 
increasingly heterarchical. From the perspective of the traditional hierarchical system, 
international or global norms governing nonstate entities have no formal binding force 
and, hence, are regarded as soft law. This includes the norms governing both private 
actors such as firms (for example, business codes of conduct and regulatory standards 
developed by international bodies such as the International Standards Organization), as 
well as public bodies (for example, MOUs between national regulators). Even 
governments may resort to soft forms of agreement to foster policy learning, convergence 
and cooperation, often between multiple layers of public and private bodies.24 
The third characteristic of multilayered governance, already discussed above, is 
the fragmentation and technicization of state functions. Certainly, there is evidence that 
global expert networks have been extremely effective in mobilizing and sustaining some 
global governance regimes, as is revealed, for example, in Penelope Canan and Nancy 
Reichman’s sociological study of the “global community” of environmental experts and 
                                                                                                                                                 
litigation to the selection of jurisdictions of convenience in order to structure international business 
activities for optimal regulatory exposure. Examples include such strategies (many of them driven by 
business lobbies) as the use of havens for tax avoidance, flags of convenience for shipping, and offshore 
finance centers for financial activities.  
20 LUC BOLTANSKI & EVE CHIAPELLO, LE NOUVEL ESPRIT DU CAPITALISME [THE NEW SPIRIT OF 
CAPITALISM] 444–455 (Gallimard 1999). 
21 See HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS (Oxford Univ. Press 1999); Jody Freeman, The 
Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155 (2000); Peter Vincent-Jones, The Regulation of 
Contractualisation in Quasi-Markets for Public Services, 1 PUB. L. 303 (1999). 
22 Colin Scott, Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A Neglected Facet of Contemporary Governance, 
29 J. LAW & SOC. 56 (2002). 
23 MICHAEL MORAN, THE BRITISH REGULATORY STATE: HIGH MODERNISM AND HYPER-INNOVATION 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2003) (using the term “club rule”). 
24 Even the EU, with its strong institutional framework, has resorted to the “open method” of coordination 
on sensitive issues such as social policies and taxation. See James S. Mosher & David M. Trubek, 
Alternative Approaches to Governance in the EU: EU Social Policy and the European Employment 
Strategy, 41 J. COMM. MKT. STUD. 63 (2003). 
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activists that formed around the Montreal Protocol.25 However, the contribution of 
technical specialists to international diplomacy is often to help gain acceptance for 
proposals; and while this input is put forward as objective and scientific, it is nonetheless 
carefully calibrated for political acceptability. Far from being depoliticized, such 
networks often include activists as well as technical specialists; and even if the issues are 
specialized, the participants share common social values. 
These characteristics may be analyzed in relation to the governance of a variety of 
issues; for example, environmental protection, intellectual property, food production, 
communications, and the internet.26 
 
1.2. Governance of taxation and finance: “Offshore” and the transformation of 
sovereignty 
 
A major catalyst in the fragmenting of state functions and the emergence of complex 
jurisdictional interactions has been the development of so-called offshore statehood. This 
involves the creation of specific regulatory regimes governing particular activities, 
sometimes amounting to legal and constitutional enclaves or a kind of privatization of 
sovereignty.27  
A notable example is that of “flags of convenience” (FoC) for international 
shipping. This arrangement, devised by U.S. lawyer-diplomats,28 dates back to the 1920s, 
when the U.S. authorities encouraged the registration of U.S.-owned ships in Panama in 
order to reduce costs while still ensuring the availability of ships in wartime. After the 
Second World War, another similar group developed Liberia as a flag state, with the 
added advantage that its shipping (and later corporate) registry business was 
subcontracted to a U.S. corporation based near Washington.29 Thus, flag states essentially 
                                                 
25 PENELOPE CANAN & NANCY REICHMAN, OZONE CONNECTIONS: EXPERT NETWORKS IN GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE (Greenleaf 2002). 
26 Another example is the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), whose province is internet regulation. 
See A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 749, 810–811 (2003). The commitment of the IETF community is not to a closed 
apolitical technicist task, but to the much broader normative value of ubiquitous global communication.  
27 Sol Picciotto, Offshore: The State as Legal Fiction, in OFFSHORE FINANCE CENTRES AND TAX HAVENS: 
THE RISE OF GLOBAL CAPITAL 43 (Mark P. Hampton & Jason P. Abbott eds., Macmillan 1999); see also 
RONEN PALAN, THE OFFSHORE WORLD: SOVEREIGN MARKETS, VIRTUAL PLACES, AND NOMAD 
MILLIONAIRES (Cornell Univ. Press 2003). 
28 With U.S. support, Panama had seceded from Colombia in 1903 to facilitate construction of the Panama 
Canal. William Cromwell, of the New York law firm Sullivan & Cromwell, became Panama’s 
representative in the U.S.; he also acted for the shipowners. Cromwell was succeeded in this role by John 
Foster Dulles, the future secretary of state. See RODNEY P. CARLISLE, SOVEREIGNTY FOR SALE 16 (Naval 
Inst. Press 1981). 
29 The Liberian International Ship and Corporate Registry is run from Vienna, Virginia, continuing an 
arrangement originally devised by a group headed by Edward R. Stettinius, a former executive at General 
Motors and U.S. Steel who served as U.S. secretary of state under Franklin D. Roosevelt. In 1947 he 
formed Stettinius Associates with former State Department colleagues and established various 
development projects in Liberia in partnership with the Liberian government. The ship registry was to be 
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offer a ship registration service, the administration of which may have little or no 
physical contact with the state itself since it is subcontracted to private firms. The actual 
surveys and the issuing of safety certificates for ships are done by recognized private 
classification societies, including the American Bureau of Shipping and Lloyd’s Register 
of Shipping.30 Because of abiding concerns about the safety standards of such “open 
registries,” spotlighted especially by the long-running campaign of the International 
Transport Federation (ITF) of trade unions, regulatory networks have emerged to try to 
deal with low or substandard ships and registries. A key development has been 
cooperation between the maritime authorities of port states. These organizations now 
coordinate their inspection systems, based on checklists of internationally agreed-upon 
standards, deficiency reporting, a computerized database, and the sanction of detention of 
vessels found defective.31 Thus, the seaworthiness and employment conditions of ships 
are governed by a variety of regulatory bodies, both public and private, national and 
international. None of them have definitive jurisdiction, although port authorities can 
apply the ultimate sanction of detention.32  
The use of havens for the avoidance of tax on income and profits, which was an 
element in the FoC system, first emerged in the early decades of the twentieth century. It 
was kept within tolerable bounds until the 1960s by a combination of national measures 
(controls on currency, capital movements, and asset transfers) and the allocation of tax 
                                                                                                                                                 
the longest lasting of these projects; by 1955, Liberia’s was the leading flag of convenience. The 
Stettinius group drafted Liberia’s Maritime Code, which provides for the administration of the ship 
registry to be subcontracted to a U.S.-based company. CARLISLE, supra note 29, 115–119. During the 
1990–96 civil war, the registry’s contribution to the Liberian national budget increased from 10–15 
percent to 90 percent. In 1996, rebel leader Charles Taylor, by this time a member of a six-person Council 
of State, initiated legal action against the administrator, from which he had been unable to obtain funds 
during the civil war. Aided by U.S. lawyer Lester Hyman, Taylor sued Virginia-based International 
Registries Inc. (IRI) in the U.S. courts, alleging that IRI was diverting shipowners to another registry and 
had failed to account properly to Liberia for its receipts. Once Taylor became president, his government 
contracted with Hyman to establish the Liberian International Shipping and Corporate Registry (LISCR), 
which took over the business in 2000. See Report of the Panel of Experts Pursuant to Security Council 
resolution 1343 (2001), paragraph 19, concerning Liberia, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1015 (2001). LISCR makes 
profits mainly from the corporate registry side of the business, which essentially facilitates tax avoidance. 
Telephone interview with Jill Keohane, senior vice-president of LISCR, Oct. 16, 2006. 
30Ten such bodies have formed the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS), which in 
December 2005 adopted a set of Common Structural Rules for ship classification and approval. See 
http://www.liscr.com/ (Liberian Registry); see also http://www.iacs.org.uk (IACS). 
31 The first regulatory network was established by twenty maritime authorities covering Europe and the 
North Atlantic, based on the Paris Memorandum of Understanding. See http://www.parismou.org. This 
network has been followed by Asia-Pacific, Caribbean, and Latin American groups. The ITF also 
maintains an international network of inspectors who liaise with the Port State Control system. 
INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT WORKERS’ FEDERATION, CAMPAIGN AGAINST FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE AND 
SUBSTANDARD SHIPPING: ANNUAL REPORT 5–7 (2004) (counting 131 inspectors in 43 countries in 2003);  
Interview with Graham Young, ITF Special Seafarers’ Department (June 1, 2006). 
32 See generally ALASTAIR D. COUPER ET AL., VOYAGES OF ABUSE: SEAFARERS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING (Pluto Press 1999); SEEFAHRT IM ZEICHEN DER GLOBALISIERUNG [SEAFARING 
AS A SIGN OF GLOBALIZATION] (Heide Gerstenberger & Ulrich Welke eds., Westfalisches Dampfboot 
2002); DALE D. MURPHY, THE STRUCTURE OF REGULATORY COMPETITION: CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC 
POLICIES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 45–71 (Oxford Univ. Press 2004). 
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rights based on a network of tax treaties. The increased international integration of 
business by transnational corporations and corporate networks led to the growth of 
networks of international tax administration, although mainly among the leading 
countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. With the shift 
to currency convertibility, the liberalization of capital movements, and 
transnationalization of banking, the tax havens also became offshore finance centers 
(OFCs), acting as catalysts for the emergence of a new internationalized financial system. 
“Offshore” became a generalized phenomenon by the 1970s and acted as a stimulus for 
the dual process of national deregulation and international reregulation. Control based on 
direct state command over the economic activity of no longer purely national firms often 
had to be abandoned and, as a result, international regulatory networking gradually 
emerged.  
Legal enclaves or special jurisdictions were created for a variety of purposes, 
often linking tax incentives with other regulatory advantages. These include export 
processing zones (EPZs), special economic zones, or enterprise zones. Building on the 
older concept of free ports, which allowed duty-free importation of goods in transit, the 
EPZs facilitated the establishment of industries based on assembly tasks or the processing 
of imported inputs for reexport. However, they often went further and created enclaves in 
which other measures were relaxed or waived, especially employment and social 
protection regulations.  
Although specially designed laws may be found everywhere, some states or 
statelets offer more comprehensive packages of arrangements specifically devised for 
avoidance purposes of one sort or another; they may be considered designer jurisdictions. 
This phenomenon—with tax avoidance or evasion often a central feature—has been 
described as the “commercialization of sovereignty.”33 It generally entails both special 
provisions for nonresidents, taking advantage of legal fictions such as corporate 
personality, and the indeterminacy of abstract legal concepts such as income and 
residence. This type of “ring fencing” has been offered in many countries, with the aim of 
attracting specific types of business or investment. However, the more comprehensive 
package, offered by outright havens, usually depends on their having a regime of zero or 
low taxation of income or profits, which applies to nonresidents; hence, it is mainly used 
for so called letter-box companies or trusts as asset-management vehicles. The 
importance of taxation to modern state economies and of income taxation means that 
outright havens of this sort often have some very distinctive features. 
Three examples may be taken as illustrations. Dubai is one of the former Trucial 
States, which in 1971 merged to form the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Specific powers 
are delegated to the UAE federal government, while others are reserved to the member 
emirates; the emir of Dubai is currently prime minister of the UAE. The legal system is 
based on a dual system of Shari’a and civil courts, and the criminal law is enacted at 
federal level. Although oil is important in Dubai’s economy, its relatively lower level of 
oil reserves, compared with the region, has led to a policy of economic development for 
the purpose of attracting mobile business. This builds on the country’s tradition as an 
entrepôt along what was known as the Pirate Coast. The Jebel Ali Free Zone has helped 
                                                 
33 Ronen Palan, Tax Havens and the Commercialization of State Sovereignty, 56 INT’L ORG. 151 (2002). 
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establish Dubai as a major port and was used as a model, first, for Dubai Internet City, 
with its highly developed technical infrastructure, and, most recently, for the Dubai 
International Financial Centre (the DIFC), established in 2002. To facilitate this latter 
institution, the UAE government passed a decree creating, in essence, a legal enclave 
within the physical territory of the DIFC. This territory is now empowered to operate its 
own system of civil laws and, essentially, to govern commercial, corporate, and financial 
matters with its own courts, staffed mainly by British judges.  
A second example is the Cayman Islands (CI), a British dependency, now 
classified as an overseas territory. The CI has long had a high degree of autonomy, even 
when administered by Britain from Jamaica and preferred not to become part of an 
independent Jamaica; thus, it has remained a U.K. territory, with a very ambivalent 
relationship to the various arms of the British government. The CI has associative status 
with the EU, together with other overseas territories, under part four of the EC treaty; 
although in principle the overseas territories are part of the EC’s customs union, they are 
allowed to “levy customs duties which meet the needs of their development and 
industrialization or produce revenue for their budgets.”34 However, the CI has never had 
any direct taxation, and government revenues rely largely on indirect taxes, mainly 
import duties, consumption taxes, and license fees. It emerged as an OFC in the 1970s 
and quickly became a major center of bank assets (largely notional), now ranked as the 
fifth largest globally, although its more recent growth has been in investment funds, 
especially hedge funds and equity funds. The British-appointed governor chairs the 
cabinet, appoints three of the eight ministers, and has certain reserve powers, including a 
general power to legislate “in the interests of public order, public faith, and good 
government.” Although the U.K. government is mostly responsible for its international 
relations, the power to negotiate international agreements has been delegated to the CI 
under “letters of Commitment” from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, especially 
in relation to finance and tax matters. 
A third example is the Principality of Liechtenstein, which was part of the Holy 
Roman Empire before becoming a sovereign state in 1816. It remains closely tied to 
Austria, since its princes were prominent in the Austro-Hungarian Empire; indeed, they 
had acquired the territory in order to qualify for a seat in the Imperial Diet and lived in 
Vienna until after the First World War. At that time a poor rural territory, Liechtenstein 
entered into a customs and monetary union with Switzerland, and in the 1930s and 
especially the 1950s it emerged as a prosperous if tiny enclave, with some high-tech 
industry, but with an economy mainly based on finance, especially private banking. 
Geographically, it is hardly offshore, as a landlocked entity surrounded by other 
landlocked states. It is, in many respects, closely integrated with those neighbors since it 
has no major airport or rail connection and no physical border or customs formalities. 
However, both immigration and residency are very closely controlled.  
The prince is the hereditary head of state, and his powers were extended following 
a controversial referendum in 2003. He represents the state in its international relations, 
although most treaties require the consent of the Parliament, and he must consent to any 
law before it can come into force. Liechtenstein has become known mainly as a center for 
                                                 
34 Treaty Establishing the European Community (signed in Rome 25 March 1957), Article 133(4) 
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discreet private banking, and additional confidentiality for private wealth may be 
provided through the Anstalt, a type of trust. The prince is also the owner of LGT Group, 
the largest private bank in his Principality, which manages the princely family’s assets, as 
it proclaims in its marketing. In early 2008, Liechtenstein became engulfed in scandal, as 
a former bank employee sold details of private accounts to tax authorities in Germany, 
which used them to launch raids and begin prosecutions against several hundred German 
residents, including some prominent industrialists.  
Although they are legal enclaves, the regulatory systems of such centers are 
closely interlinked with those of other countries. Their status as havens depends on their 
ability to offer regulatory advantages in relation to other countries, which means that they 
must maneuver within certain limits of tolerance. Indeed, the emergence of OFCs in the 
1970s occurred with some degree of encouragement on the part of the monetary 
authorities of the leading countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD); they offered a way of managing the transition from fixed to 
floating exchange rates and the hard-to-control boundaries between the current and 
capital accounts of the balance of payments. However, the rise of offshore finance has 
also been identified, at various times since then, as a weak point in the system of financial 
regulation, both with regard to systemic security and in its use for illicit purposes. Thus, 
attempts have been made to bring the regulatory systems of OFCs into line with global 
norms since the 1980s, mainly through informal international regulatory groupings such 
as the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions, and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Concerns about 
the increase in tax evasion and avoidance due to economic globalization also have led to 
attempts by the tax authorities of the OECD countries to take action against havens. 
These efforts, since 1998, have been coordinated through the campaigns against “harmful 
tax competition” of the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs (OECD-CFA), and the 
Code of Conduct Group set up by the EU as a form of “soft coordination.”35 
Offshore jurisdictions are not niche or marginal phenomena. As part of the 
attempt to bring them more closely into the global governance networks, organizations 
such as the OECD and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) have identified more than 
forty countries as havens or OFCs (most of them being both). Beyond these specific 
jurisdictions, “offshore” is also a system or process of regulatory interaction driven by 
competition, which, in many ways, also permeates major onshore states. To deal with 
both aspects, attempts have been made to bring about some closer coordination of 
financial regulation, especially after the debates following the Asian crisis of 1997–98. 
These efforts were orchestrated mainly through the G7 finance ministers and central bank 
governors, though drawing in a wider group of emerging economies and the leading 
developing countries,36 which resulted in the establishment of the FSF. It was through 
                                                 
35 Claudio M. Radaelli, The Code of Conduct against Harmful Tax Competition: Open Method of 
Coordination in Disguise?, 81 PUB. ADMIN. 513 (2003). 
36 The April 1998 meeting called by the G7 was attended by finance ministers and central bank governors 
from Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, the U.K., and 
the U.S., as well as the heads of the Bank for International Settlements, International Monetary Fund, 
World Bank, and OECD; with some changes in membership, this meeting later became semiformalized 
as the G20. 
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this group that a compendium of financial standards and codes was identified and spelled 
out. The FSF continues to maintain an overview of these standards,37 although the actual 
monitoring of compliance with these standards and codes by all major financial centers 
has been turned over to the staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank (WB) (in conjunction with the FATF and related bodies for anti-money laundering 
and combating the financing of terrorism standards). The process by which this occurs is 
called the Reviews of Standards and Codes. However, the tax aspects have been kept 
separate, remaining under the auspices of the OECD-CFA, which has established a global 
forum in response to the insistence of non-OECD countries that tax cooperation should 
be even-handed, so as to establish a level playing field. 
The upshot is that attempts to establish a clearer structure and more orderly 
coordination of regulatory arrangements have tended, rather, to spawn new groupings and 
networks. 
 
2. Legitimacy and legalization 
The law and lawyers have played a major role in the construction and management of 
these globalized regulatory networks. Much of their work is low profile or behind the 
scenes. However, there has also been a more visible trend toward legalization of global 
governance institutions; to a great extent, it is in response to some of the legitimacy 
problems mentioned above.  
A conspicuous example is the WTO, as demonstrated by the great stress placed on 
the WTO as embodying the rule of law in world trade. Thus, after the organization was 
shaken by the debacle at Seattle,38 the then–secretary-general Mike Moore, delivering a 
speech on “The Backlash against Globalization?” concluded as follows: 
The WTO is a powerful force for good in the world. Yet we are too 
often misunderstood, sometimes genuinely, often willfully. We are 
not a world government in any shape or form. People do not want a 
world government, and we do not aspire to be one. At the WTO, 
governments decide, not us. 
 But people do want global rules. If the WTO did not exist, 
people would be crying out for a forum where governments could 
negotiate rules, ratified by national parliaments, that promote freer 
trade and provide a transparent and predictable framework for 
business. And they would be crying out for a mechanism that helps 
governments avoid coming to blows over trade disputes. That is 
what the WTO is. We do not lay down the law. We uphold the rule 
                                                 
37 The FSF Secretariat prepares a paper for the biannual FSF meetings which surveys ongoing work and 
regulatory initiatives relating to financial market supervision, going well beyond the twelve existing 
compendium standards. 
38 The negotiations to launch a new trade round at the Ministerial Conference held at Seattle in December 
1999 collapsed ignominiously, amid sharp disagreements in the closed sessions, while demonstrators 
fought police in the streets. 
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of law. The alternative is the law of the jungle, where might makes 
right and the little guy doesn’t get a look in.39 
 
The political acceptability of compliance with the wide range of WTO obligations rests 
essentially on the quasi-judicial form of its dispute-settlement (DS) procedure, and, 
principally, its Appellate Body (AB). Yet this role has been framed by a narrow mandate 
that formally reserves the power to interpret the agreements to the “political” bodies of 
member state representatives.  
An influential group of commentators has suggested that the WTO rates highly 
with regard to legification according to three criteria: that it is based on rules which are 
considered binding, which are precise, and the interpretation of which has been delegated 
to a third-party adjudicator.40 This has been criticized as taking a narrow view of law.41 
The formalist view rests on the premise that law provides relatively precise rules, so that 
legalization reflects political decisions made by states to make “credible commitments,” 
the application of which they delegate to adjudicators operating within a formalist 
rationality.42 
Matters are not so straightforward, however. WTO adjudication entails skillful 
navigation through a labyrinth of legal rules, and not only within the complex structure of 
the WTO agreements themselves but also among the many related regulatory regimes 
with which they intersect. Moreover, the key WTO obligations are expressed in terms of 
abstract general principles, subject to counteracting exceptions and involving a high 
degree of indeterminacy.43 Despite this, the AB has adopted a formalist approach that 
stresses a literal approach to the rules, largely to avoid accusations of creative 
interpretation. It has done so with some subtlety, however, emphasizing the objective 
application of the words of the agreements to placate the broader public while hoping to 
persuade specialists in trade and economic regulation through shared understandings of 
the interpretations that are desirable to achieve the goals of free trade. Unfortunately, it 
risks failing to convince insiders, while doing little to persuade a broader constituency of 
the fairness of WTO rules.44 
 
                                                 
39 Mike Moore, The Backlash against Globalization? (speech presented in Ottawa, Canada on Oct. 26, 
2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm39_e.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 
2001). 
40 Kenneth O. W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 404–406 (2000). 
41 Martha Finnemore & Stephen J. Toope, Alternatives to “Legalization”: Richer Views of Law and 
Politics, 55 INT’L ORG. 743 (2001). 
42 Kenneth O. W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L 
ORG. 421, 426–427 (2000). 
43 Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute-Resolution, 40 HARV. INT’L L. J. 333, 346 (1999); 
Petros C. Mavroidis, Come Together? Producer Welfare, Consumer Welfare, and WTO Rules, in 
REFORMING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 277, 282 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., Oxford Univ. Press 
2005). 
44 Sol Picciotto, The WTO’s Appellate Body: Legal Formalism as a Legitimation of Global Governance, 18 
GOVERNANCE 477 (2005) (developing this analysis in greater detail). 
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3. Global rule of law and “constitutionalization” 
The trend toward legalization of global governance has been seen by some as leading to 
the establishment of a global rule of law, formalized, perhaps, through forms of 
“constitutionalization.” It is, again, the WTO that has been the focus of these debates, 
unsurprisingly, since its structure and emphasis on market liberalization has made it a 
point of intersection among many regulatory arrangements.  
The theme of the WTO as institutionalizing the rule of law in the world economy 
has been debated among academic commentators under the rubric of the 
“constitutionalization” of international economic law. The term was applied to the 
WTO’s predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), by the doyen 
of trade lawyers John Jackson, who coined the term the “trade constitution” in the 
following sense: 
It is a very complex mix of economic and governmental policies, 
political constraints, and above all . . . an intricate set of constraints 
imposed by a variety of “rules” or legal norms in a particular 
institutional setting. . . . This “constitution” imposes different levels 
of constraint on the policy options available to public or private 
leaders.45  
 
The current WTO director general Pascal Lamy has stressed the “integrated and 
distinctive” nature of the WTO’s legal order and has considered its relationship to the 
legal systems of other organizations with sensitivity to accusations of being hegemonic.46 
However, he is forthright in stating the WTO’s basic philosophy is that “trade opening 
obligations are good, and even necessary, to increase people’s standards of living and 
well-being,”47 and although he points to various means by which the WTO legal system 
contributes to an overall coherence of international law he also accepts that there are 
“cracks” in that coherence.48  
On the other hand, and from a political perspective, Stephen Gill has attacked the 
“new constitutionalism”—represented not only by the WTO but by other institutions of 
global governance—as a “project of attempting to make transnational liberalism, and if 
possible liberal democratic capitalism, the sole model for future development.”49 Gill 
argues that the global constitutionalization project is well under way and headed in a 
clearly undesirable, neoliberal direction.  
A detailed study by Deborah Cass, however, suggests that it is inappropriate or 
premature to assume that the constitutionalization of the WTO is a fait accompli. She 
                                                 
45 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS 299 (MIT Press 1989) (framing the word “constitution” with inverted commas); see also 
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS 339–340 (MIT Press 1997) (developing the concept more and sometimes removing the 
inverted commas).  
46 Pascal Lamy, The Place and Role of the WTO and Its Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 969, 977 (2006). 
47 Id. at 978. 
48 Id. at 982. 
49 STEPHEN GILL, POWER AND RESISTANCE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 132 (Palgrave Macmillan 2003). 
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identifies six core elements of the accepted meaning of the term and outlines three 
models or “visions” of WTO constitutionalization: (1) institutional managerialism 
(“management of policy diversity between states by institutions and rules”); (2) rights-
based constitutionalization (recognition of a right to trade, enforced in national laws); and 
(3) judicial norm generation (development of a WTO constitutional system by the AB, 
adopting constitutional procedural rules and incorporating domestic subject matters such 
as health).50 I will consider here the latter two models, including the contentious issue of 
the effect of a strong “constitutionalization” of the WTO, with the inclusion of human 
rights in its core principles.  
Constitutional norms could emerge from the WTO’s AB, as the apex of its dispute 
settlement system, in creating the jurisprudence of the WTO. This would follow the trail 
blazed by the European Court of Justice, which played a transformative role by 
developing doctrines such as supremacy and the direct effect of European law, thereby 
helping to reconfigure the European Community as more than merely an international 
organization.51 There are, nevertheless, significant limitations on the role a judicial body 
can play in this respect. This has been demonstrated, clearly, by the EU’s failure to create 
the political basis for any kind of “constitution,” leaving it in the institutional limbo of 
multilevel governance. These limitations are even clearer for the AB, which has been 
kept on a very tight leash by the WTO’s member states; moreover, it lacks the channels 
for networking with national judiciaries that have been an important element of the ECJ’s 
relative success.52 Although the AB is, indeed, an international economic court in all but 
name53 and has been gradually developing a coherent body of jurisprudence, it has done 
so under the cloak of a strict formalism, as suggested in the previous section. 
Nevertheless, a basis does exist for the AB to enhance both its own and the 
WTO’s legitimacy through the incorporation of human rights norms. As Pauwelyn points 
out, although it may have come as a surprise to some trade negotiators, the general rules 
of international law necessarily apply to the relations between WTO member states, and 
the WTO agreements form part of that general body of law and thus must be 
accommodated to it in some way.54 Indeed, the AB has often stressed that the reference to 
the clarification of the WTO agreements “in accordance with the customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law” requires that the AB apply the principles of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT); these include “any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties” as a pertinent context for 
                                                 
50 DEBORAH Z. CASS, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGITIMACY, 
DEMOCRACY, AND COMMUNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM 21–22 (Oxford Univ. Press 
2005). 
51 Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 
(1981); Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991). 
52 Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 
107 YALE L.J. 273, 277 (1997). 
53 Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and 
External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 191, 202 (2001). 
54 Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. 
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treaty interpretation.55 Since many human rights principles are recognized as obligations 
erga omnes in general international law and WTO member states are all parties to the UN 
Charter as well as, in many cases, other specific human rights conventions, the legal route 
lies open for the AB to assert that WTO obligations should be interpreted in line with 
obligations under international law, including human rights principles.  
Yet there has been a marked reluctance to make any such assertion, not only on 
the part of the AB but also of WTO diplomats and officials.56 In any case, a claim under 
the dispute settlement procedure must allege a breach of WTO rules and, under the 
formalist approach favored by the WTO, other rules can only be applied if they are 
invoked by the defendant state. Hence, the fact that no state has yet invoked human rights 
obligations in a dispute under the WTO (or, for that matter, the GATT) has been taken to 
mean that there is no rationale for taking human rights into account.57  
Even when non-WTO rules applicable between the parties are invoked, there is 
considerable scope for an adjudicator to decide whether to adopt a bold or cautious 
approach to the general question of the relationship between WTO rules and other 
international law obligations. From the perspective of the WTO, the preference has been 
for caution. First, an issue may be construed narrowly so as to confine it to WTO rules. 
This fits well with the AB’s emphasis on the principle of “judicial economy,” namely, the 
avoidance of pronouncing on issues when doing so is not necessary to resolve the specific 
complaint before it. In particular, this means that consideration of non-WTO rules may be 
avoided unless they are clearly in conflict with WTO obligations.  
A different approach has been suggested, notably by the work of the International 
Law Commission (ILC) on the Fragmentation of International Law.58 This body has 
argued that international law must be regarded as a system, and, hence, that its norms 
may have relationships which require accommodation through  interpretation, and not 
only characterized by conflict. Under this approach the interpreter of a treaty has an 
obligation (under article 31[(3][c] of the VCLT) to take into account any relevant rules of 
                                                 
55 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), article 31. 
56 WTO staff members have published academic articles on the subject. See, e.g. Hoe Lim, Trade and 
Human Rights What’s at Issue?, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 275 (2001); Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute 
Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 753 (2002). Although, of course, they stress that the 
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veritable nightmare.” See Economic and Social Council, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
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57 Lim, supra note 53, at 284. 
58 Study Group of the International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.702, (July 18, 
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international law applicable to the parties, and to interpret them, as far as possible, in 
such a way as to further the “objective of ‘systemic’ integration.”59 So far, however, the 
AB has been reluctant to look beyond the texts of the WTO agreements, unless a conflict 
is alleged with another norm. A key tactic, then, has been to adopt a strict approach that 
assumes rules are compatible unless it is impossible to comply with both. This has been 
the view of the AB, which has defined a conflict as “a situation where adherence to one 
provision will lead to a violation of the other provision.”60  
Legal indeterminacy leaves considerable latitude in interpreting rules so as to find 
them compatible. A notable example is the AB’s approach to the application of the 
“precautionary principle” to food-safety rules. It has rejected arguments that the WTO 
rules should be interpreted in the light of this principle, on the grounds (a) that opinions 
differ as to whether the principle is accepted as binding in international law, (b) that it 
would therefore be “unnecessary, and probably imprudent . . . to take a position on this 
important, but abstract, question,” and that (c)  the principle is reflected, in any case, in 
WTO rules.61 Finally, even if a conflict were to be found, there is considerable room for 
debate as to how it should be resolved under the various accepted treaty-interpretation 
principles. In particular, the principle lex specialis derogat legi generali (priority should 
be given to specific rather than more general rules) is likely to lead to the view that WTO 
trade rules cannot be overridden by general human rights obligations (unless, of course, 
the latter are considered fundamental principles of jus cogens). Indeed, even authors who 
believe that the AB should apply non-WTO rules, where relevant, tend to accept that in 
cases of conflict the WTO rules should prevail.62  
The general approach has been to stress the strictly limited function of the WTO’s 
dispute settlement system—to the point where it is said to be a lex specialis, or a self-
contained legal system.63 Some writers concede, nevertheless, that “if the WTO system is 
                                                 
59 Id. at para. 17. 
60 See Appellate Body Report, Guatemala–Antidumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from 
Mexico, ¶ 65, WT/DS60/AB/R (Nov. 5, 1998), indicating that this approach means that a state may be 
unable to exercise a right created under international law subsequent to the WTO agreements, cited in 
Pauwelyn, supra note 52, at 551. 
61 Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, ¶ 123, 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Feb. 13, 1998) (focusing mainly on the agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)); Panel Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting the Approval 
and Marketing of Biotech Products, ¶ 7.89, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29 2006) 
(following this view).  
62 Lorand Bartels bases this on treating articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU) as a “conflicts” rule, since they specify that DS decisions cannot add to or diminish rights or 
obligations of WTO members, panels and the Appellate Body must apply the WTO rule in case of a 
conflict. Lorand Bartels, Applicable Law in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 
499, 499–500 (2001); contra Marceau, supra note 53 (disagreeing with this reasoning but coming to the 
same conclusion). Pauwelyn, supra note 52, at 564, says that these provisions actually aim at reining in 
the DS system from expansive or adventurous interpretations of WTO trade rules, but he provides only a 
very egregious example of a situation in which a panel might be obliged to find a WTO rule invalid, viz., 
if the WTO were to conclude a slave-trading agreement. 
63 Marceau, supra note 53, at 767. 
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largely self-contained, it is not entirely self-contained”64 in that WTO rules may 
themselves refer to or incorporate other international law rules.65 This is most notoriously 
the case for the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(known as the TRIPS agreement), which incorporates (and, therefore, makes binding on 
all WTO members) the major provisions of key intellectual property conventions 
administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization. Slightly more indirectly, 
others, such as the Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures and the Technical Barriers to 
Trade agreements, create an obligation for WTO member states to use standards 
developed by relevant international organizations, where they exist.66 Such provisions, in 
effect, make the WTO’s dispute settlement system an enforcement body for these other 
areas of international law as well.67 
The view of the WTO as partly “self-contained” means that it is a matter for each 
state to ensure the compatibility of WTO rules with its international obligations, such as 
human rights norms, which are not specifically incorporated into the WTO agreements. 
“States, members of the WTO, remain fully bound and responsible for any violation of 
their international law obligations but they cannot use the WTO remedial machinery to 
enforce them.”68 Furthermore, the WTO is considered to be no more than a forum for 
states, with no executive powers, unlike the IMF and WB, so that neither the organization 
itself nor its secretariat has any direct obligations to ensure the compatibility of its work 
with human rights obligations.69  
This approach suggests a modest role for WTO rules and their enforcement, but 
the effect is, in fact, quite the opposite; it reinforces their power. The WTO is 
exceptional, indeed unique, among international organizations for the range and 
effectiveness of its compliance mechanisms. Most prominent is the dispute-settlement 
system, which offers independent adjudication providing a complainant with a guarantee 
of a decision within a relatively short time frame and the possibility of applying what 
amount to trade sanctions if the decision is not complied with. Less visible, but also 
effective, are the more extensive procedural arrangements for supervision of member 
state compliance through the range of WTO committees. In contrast, the compliance 
mechanisms of international human rights instruments must be considered weak. They 
rely mainly on self-reporting by states and scrutiny by committees of experts. Some 
                                                 
64 David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 398, 
413 (1998). 
65 Trachtman, supra note 42, at 343. 
66 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (hereinafter TBT), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, art. 2(4), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm; and Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures, art. 3(1) (idem.).  
67 Thus the Appellate Body has ruled on whether food-labeling regulations complied with a Codex 
standard; Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Trade Description of Sardines, 
WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002); and the WTO Panel has ruled on the validity of copyright exceptions 
under the “three-step test” of the Berne Copyright Convention, Panel Report, United States–Section 
110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000). 
68 Marceau, supra note 53, at 34. 
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(notably the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) also provide options for 
states to allow complaints by other states, as well as individual petitions; other 
mechanisms such as fact-finding missions have also been developed. Crucially, however, 
compliance depends on “naming and shaming,” and it lacks the hard economic impact of 
the WTO’s ultimate sanction of withdrawal of trade advantages. These powers are the 
potential attractions of a more formal inclusion of human rights principles within the 
WTO framework, which are now not available because WTO law is treated in such 
modest fashion as a lex specialis. 
The argument for a rights-based WTO “constitution” has been advanced most 
fervently by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, who, for some years and in many repeated 
writings, has proposed a combination of trade and human rights from a social-market 
perspective based on ordoliberal theory.70 This aims to entrench internationally agreed-
upon principles to secure the “effective judicial protection of the transnational exercise of 
individual rights.”71 This arrangement would enshrine economic rights, such as the 
“freedom to trade,” as fundamental rights of individuals, legally enforceable through 
national constitutions in national courts.72 While accepting that freedom of trade should 
also be accompanied by other human rights—and these, too, should be enshrined in the 
WTO “constitution”—Petersmann’s emphasis is on rights of private property and market 
freedoms. However, he goes further and argues that liberal-minded traders should 
welcome the inclusions of human rights regarding individual freedom, discrimination, 
and equal opportunity, and, additionally, that the mercantilist bias of WTO in favor of 
producers could be corrected by the protection of competition and of the rights of “the 
general consumer and citizen interest in liberal trade and . . . human rights.”73 
Already, the effect of the institutionalization of the WTO is to constrain national 
policy choices by embedding broad and stringent international obligations that liberalize 
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international economic flows. WTO enthusiasts argue that this is necessary because 
national state regulation tends to be protectionist since it is the product of the “capture” of 
states by special interests. For example: 
Free trade and democratic government face a common obstacle—the 
influence of concentrated interest groups. . . . The WTO and the 
trade agreements it administers act to restrain protectionist interest 
groups, thereby promoting both free trade and democracy.74 
 
The antidemocratic implications of this view are justified by its roots in a particular 
concept of liberal democracy, in which state power must be constrained in order to 
safeguard individual rights and liberties. This constraint would be further reinforced by 
the strong vision of the constitutionalization of the WTO, as put forward especially by 
Petersmann, who seems to consider all politics—including the WTO’s rules and 
procedures and its deliberative democratic discourse—as favoring a producer-biased 
mercantilism. It is for this reason that his proposals for entrenching human rights are seen 
as a means of counterbalancing this state of affairs by representing general consumer and 
citizen interests.75 However, giving individuals, including investors and corporations, 
rights they could enforce directly, in national courts or through the WTO’s dispute-
settlement system or both, would further limit the possibilities of collective action 
through the state or public bodies. Doing so, moreover, could work to exacerbate 
economic inequalities by handing a powerful weapon to those whose considerable 
economic power could be defended in terms of morally underpinned economic rights. 
4. Conclusions 
Does constitutionalization have a part to play in an emerging system of global 
metagovernance? Much depends, obviously, on the model of constitutionalism that is 
proposed. As the analysis above has suggested, the model that generally has been put 
forward is essentially a liberal version. This type of constitution is a precommitment 
device, aiming to restrict the power of the state and, hence, the will of the people through 
a strong form of institutionalization of metaprinciples. Whatever the merits and 
limitations of this model at the national level, the problems at the international level are 
that it would further reinforce the principles of economic liberalization forming the main 
planks of the dominant international organizations (such as the WTO). The dangers of 
imposing constraints on state action based on general principles of individual liberty, in 
the area of economic regulation, are fairly clear.76  
Yet it is equally clear that the traditional forms of jurisdictional and regulatory 
coordination of classical liberalism are inadequate in a world that is increasingly and ever 
more closely integrated economically. Certainly, one of the challenges for 
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constitutionalism in a world of multilevel governance is that of establishing and 
maintaining some kind of institutional coherence. This perhaps suggests some kind of 
multilevel constitutionalism, which, Paolo Carrozza argues, should be viewed as a 
dynamic process of both cooperation and integration between levels.77 However, it is also 
important to understand that this is not merely a matter of ensuring functional or 
administrative coherence. This is certainly difficult enough; the foregoing analysis of 
regulatory networks shows that they emerge in a haphazard and opportunistic way, 
undermining the classical liberal hierarchical order of states, rather than reordering it in a 
multilevel system. Nor is it sufficient, in my view, to find an appropriate form for the 
articulation of systems of individual fundamental rights. A democratic constitutionalism 
must also provide appropriate procedures and institutions for the formulation of 
collective preferences, to guide the actions of states and of all public bodies. The 
difficulties of doing so in a world that remains culturally and politically diverse, and 
where economic inequalities and social divisions have increased, pose probably the 
greatest challenge for democracy in the twenty-first century.  
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